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Bethnai -> RE: The Risk Premium (5/25/2008 8:59:08 PM)
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That was a good article. Stuff that made me twitch. If Shell had gotten word to evacuate its people, why hadn’t Willbros? If the workers had known how much danger they were in, they would have demanded to leave, and the company would have lost hundreds of thousands of dollars with each day of work stoppage. It was entirely possible, Spell reflected, that Willbros was playing a game of chicken with Shell over costs. He had seen this ploy during his days working on rigs in the Gulf of Mexico: Who would pay for removing workers when a major storm approached? Spell knew that service companies rarely chicken out first. The proclamation of “Dark February” came from the newly formed Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta; violence, their leaders declared, would escalate in the area, and for that reason all foreign oil companies should evacuate their employees by midnight, February 17. MEND’s leaders stated that they had chosen armed resistance because of Shell’s refusal to pay the Nigerian government a $1.5 billion fine for polluting Ijaw fishing waters. They had bottled water and food; sometimes there was fruit and sometimes fresh fish, which the hostages declined, having seen the filthy water they came from The malaria medication, Spell noted, came in boxes wrapped in paper stamped with the Shell insignia. Willbros’ internal investigation, reported in its 2005 10K filing, also revealed that, dating back to 1996, company executives had paid bribes in other countries to avoid paying taxes and had paid off judicial authorities to rule their way in foreign courts, generating the money to do so through fictitious invoices from nonexistent vendors. Although the FCPA provisions are designed to allow American companies to compete with foreign rivals, Willbros had gone too far: To win a contract in Nigeria in 2004 worth $387.5 million, Forbes reported, Willbros employees paid out about $6 million in bribes. When asked by Nigerian officials for $1.5 million more, Willbros had to borrow from an unnamed German multinational corporation, which promptly delivered $1 million in cash in a suitcase to a Nigerian-based Willbros manager, who greased the proper palms. Under the FCPA, that conduct was against the law. Meanwhile, the risk premium was at work; due to MEND, oil production from Nigeria had fallen by 20 to 25 percent, and the price worldwide had risen to more than $64 a barrel. Lagos, Willbros gave Spell $500 in travel money and a sheet of paper titled “Discussion Points for Russell.” He had to be careful when he spoke to the press. According to the list, he wasn’t supposed to mention the client, Shell (“They are very sensitive about the situation and want to have absolute control over any mention of the company on this deal”). Nor was Spell to mention Governor Ibori (“Not sure if he is in control”) or any empathy he might have developed for the militants (“Too touchy!”). He should say that Willbros was a “good company.” He should stay away from words like “bunkering, pollution, corruption, . . . Exxon, and Chevron.” Environmental issues were not to be discussed (“Way too sensitive of an issue for us to get caught up in; we do not know the facts”). Basically, Russell Spell’s life-changing experience was off-the-record.
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